VBF is a collection of C++ classes designed for analyzing vector Boolean functions (functions that map a Boolean vector to another Boolean vector) from a cryptographic perspective. This implementation uses the NTL library from Victor Shoup, adding new modules that call NTL functions and complement the existing ones, making it better suited to cryptography. The class representing a vector Boolean function can be initialized by several alternative types of data structures such as Truth Table, Trace Representation, and Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), among others. The most relevant cryptographic criteria for both block and stream ciphers as well as for hash functions can be evaluated with VBF: it obtains the nonlinearity, linearity distance, algebraic degree, linear structures, and frequency distribution of the absolute values of the Walsh Spectrum or the Autocorrelation Spectrum, among others. In addition, operations such as equality testing, composition, inversion, sum, direct sum, bricklayering (parallel application of vector Boolean functions as employed in Rijndael cipher), and adding coordinate functions of two vector Boolean functions are presented. Finally, three real applications of the library are described: the first one analyzes the KASUMI block cipher, the second one analyzes the Mini-AES cipher, and the third one finds Boolean functions with very high nonlinearity, a key property for robustness against linear attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, vector Boolean functions (functions that map a Boolean vector to another Boolean vector) play an important role in various fields of science and engineering, such as Coding Theory [MacWilliams and Sloane 1977] , Switching Theory [Davio et al. 1978] , and Cryptography [Carlet 2008a [Carlet , 2008c . Conventional secret key cryptosystems can be expressed as a certain composition of vector Boolean functions. Thus, in cipher design, it is essential to define criteria that measure the cryptographic strength (i.e., This work has been partially supported by projects MTM2007-62064 of MEyC and MTM2010-15102 of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, CCG10-UPM/ESP-5236 of Comunidad de Madrid/UPM, and Ayuda Q10 0930-144 of the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain. Authors' addresses: J. A.Álvarez-Cubero and P. J. Zufiria, Depto. Matemática Aplicada a las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones, ETSIT-UPM, Avda. Complutense 30, 28040 Madrid, Spain; emails: jaacubero@gmail.com, pedro.zufiria@upm.es. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. c 2016 ACM 0098-3500/2016/05-ART16 $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10. 1145/2794077 (1) It is free software, and may be used according to the terms of the GNU General Public License. (2) It provides high-quality implementations of state-of-the-art algorithms for the Galois field of order 2. (3) It may be easily installed in a wide range of platforms. (4) It provides a clean and consistent interface to a large variety of classes representing mathematical objects that are useful in cryptology.
The VBF library makes use of all the Boolean mathematical objects defined in NTL modules as a starting point. However, it necessarily introduces several new algorithms and structures associated with cryptographic criteria in order to address the characterization of real systems, as shown later in this article.
The main advantages of this approach are derived from the object-oriented implementation and the use of effective algorithms; such advantages are reusability, maintainability, extensibility, and flexibility in the analysis of a broad range of vector Boolean functions employed in symmetric ciphers. The size of the vector Boolean functions that can be analyzed by VBF is restricted by the computational resources (memory, disk space, CPU, etc.) of the platform on which it is executed. However, the maximum value for n and m to be handled by the different functions is conditioned by the maximum value attainable by long int variables (for the computer employed in this work, it is approximately 2 30 , so that n max = m max ≈ 30). Note that, although these size functions would be compatible with the VBF resource management procedures, the runtime requirements for computing the characteristics would exceed any realistic bound. In order to illustrate VBF applicability in this article, S-boxes used in modern symmetric primitives are studied: a modern cipher used very widely in mobile communications called KASUMI [3rd Generation Partnership Project 2005] is characterized together with a Mini version of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard); also, highly nonlinear Boolean functions robust against linear attacks are designed.
At the present time, several other packages are available for analyzing vector Boolean functions from the cryptographical point of view, for example:
(1) CRYPTOOL [2014] is a free, open-source e-learning application, used in the implementation and analysis of cryptographic algorithms. It provides cryptanalytical measurement methods (entropy, n-grams, autocorrelation, etc.) , but it does not allow the calculation of cryptographic criteria. The current release version, CrypTool 2, is based on the latest .NET Framework (currently .NET 4.0) and it has a pureplugin architecture. There is also another project called JCrypTool developed in Java and based on Eclipse RCP. Bibliowicz et al. [2003] , a system for assisting in the analysis of some criteria of DES-like ciphers is described. This system analyzes only a small subset of the criteria considered by VBF. (4) bma [Pommerening 2005a [Pommerening , 2005b In summary, the packages cited present one (or more) of the following disadvantages: they are commercial, they do not benefit from the new paradigms of object orientation and generic programming, and/or they do not cover the broad spectrum of representation and cryptographic criteria for both Boolean and vector Boolean functions that VBF does. The aim of the VBF package presented in this article is to provide an easy-to-use tool both for the designer and the cryptanalyst of symmetric ciphers. The user only needs to code the basic features related to the vector Boolean functions associated with a cipher (e.g., Truth Table, ANF table, polynomial in ANF , etc.) .
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the main vector Boolean function concepts. Section 3 starts with the general principles that influenced the design of VBF and describes the VBF classes related to the initialization, cryptographic criteria, and operations over vector Boolean functions. Section 4 gives examples of applications of the VBF framework, analyzing the modern cipher KASUMI together with the Mini-AES, and designing highly nonlinear Boolean functions. Finally, concluding remarks are summarized in Section 5.
PRELIMINARIES
The mathematical theory of vector Boolean functions starts with the formal definition of vector spaces whose elements (vectors) have binary elements. Let < GF(2), +, · > be the finite field of order 2, where GF(2) = Z 2 = {0, 1}, "+" the "integer addition modulo 2," and "·" the "integer multiplication modulo 2." V n is the vector space of ntuples of elements from GF(2). The direct sum of x ∈ V n 1 and y ∈ V n 2 is defined as x ⊕ y = (x 1 , . . . , x n 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n 2 ) ∈ V n 1 +n 2 . The inner product of x, y ∈ V n is denoted by x · y, and the inner product of real vectors x, y ∈ R n is denoted by x, y . One can now define binary functions between this type of vector spaces, whose linearity analysis (for robustness-against-attacks purposes) becomes very important.
f : V n → GF(2) is called a Boolean function and F n is the set of all Boolean functions on V n . L n is the set of all linear Boolean functions on V n : L n = {l u ∀ u ∈ V n | l u (x) = u · x} and A n is the set of all affine Boolean functions on V n .
It is possible to characterize Boolean functions via alternative and very useful associated mappings. In the following, some of these mappings are presented. The real-valued mapping χ u (x) = (−1)
u·x for x, u ∈ V n is called a character. The character form of f ∈ F n is defined as χ f (x) = (−1)
f (x) . The Truth Table of χ f is defined as the (1, −1)-sequence vector or sequence vector of f and is denoted by ξ f ∈ R 2 n . Let f ∈ F n be a Boolean function; the Walsh transform of f at u ∈ V n is an n-dimensional Discrete Fourier Transform and can be obtained as follows:
The autocorrelation of f ∈ F n with respect to the shift u ∈ V n is a measure of the statistical dependency among the involved variables (indicating robustness against randomness-based attacks). It is the cross-correlation of f with itself, denoted by r f (u) : V n → Z and defined by
The factor 1 2 n is generally omitted (see Carlet [2004] ). The directional derivative of f ∈ F n in the direction of u ∈ V n is defined by
We call the linear kernel of f the set of those vectors u such that u f is a constant function. The linear kernel of any Boolean function is a subspace of V n . Any element u of the linear kernel of f is said to be a linear structure of f .
Given f ∈ F n , a nonzero function g ∈ F n is called an annihilator of f if fg = 0. We now extend the scope of the study by considering functions between any pair of binary-valued vector spaces.
is called a vector Boolean function and F n,m is the set of all vector Boolean functions F : Chabaud and Vaudenay [1995] as
Again, several mappings associated with a vector Boolean function can be defined, in similar terms to the case of binary functions. Hence, the character form of (u, v) ∈ V n × V m can be defined as follows: χ (u,v) 
u·x+v·y . Similarly, let F ∈ F n,m be a vector Boolean function; its Walsh Transform is the two-dimensional Walsh transform defined byθ
Also, the autocorrelation of F ∈ F n,m with respect to the shift (u, v) ∈ V n × V m is the cross-correlation of F with itself, denoted by r F (u, v) : V n × V m → Z, so that [Nyberg 1995] 
Let F ∈ F n,m and u ∈ V n ; then the difference vector Boolean function of F in the direction of u ∈ V n , denoted by u F ∈ F n,m , is defined as follows: u F(x) = F(x + u) + F(x), x ∈ V n . If the following equality is satisfied: u F(x) = c, c ∈ V n , ∀ x ∈ V n , then u ∈ V n is called a linear structure of F.
Finally, we define the simplifying notation for the maximum of the absolute values of a set of real numbers {a uv } u,v , characterized by vectors u and v, as max (a uv ) = max (u,v) {|a uv |}. Using the same simplifying notation, we can define the * max (·) operator on a set of real numbers {a uv } u,v , as * max (a uv ) = max (u,v) =(0,0) {|a uv |}. This notation will be used in some criteria definitions.
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY: CLASSES, CRYPTOGRAPHIC CRITERIA, AND OPERATIONS
The core of the VBF library is the VBF class, which represents vector Boolean functions whose data members and member functions make use of the NTL modules listed in Table 1 .1 of the User Manual that accompanies the software [VBF 2015] . However, some new cryptography-related member functions were added to the previous modules. New modules, which are not present in NTL, are defined and they are listed in Table 1 .2 of VBF [2015] .
The main file in the library, called VBF.h, has the definitions of the objects described in the next subsection and makes use of the cited modules.
VBF Class: Initialization and Representations
Here we describe the methods that can be used to represent a VBF class related to a vector Boolean function F ∈ F n,m . Some of these representations can be used to initialize a VBF class.
(1) Truth Table, defined as T F ∈ M 2 n ×m (GF(2)), where
satisfying that f i i ∈ {1, . . . , m} are its component functions; each
n− j , and all the vectors of V n can be listed so that α 0 < α 1 < · · · < α 2 n−1 .
The Truth Table for an n-variable Boolean function f should be in lexicographical form, that is,
Since the Truth Table length might be too large, we represent it in hexadecimal rather than in binary notation. The hexadecimal Truth Table is obtained by replacing each 4 bits by their corresponding hexadecimal form. For instance, to enter f = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), one should just write 3F. (2) Trace representation. When m = n, we endow V n with the structure of the field GF(2 n ). Any F ∈ F n,n admits a unique univariate polynomial representation over GF(2 n ), of degree at most 2 n − 1:
A general way to derive this polynomial representation is given by a Lagrange interpolation from the knowledge of the irreducible polynomial of degree n over GF(2) associated with the field GF(2 n ) and the Truth Table of F.
The interpolation attack [Jakobsen and Knudsen 1997] is efficient when the degree of the univariate polynomial representation of the S-box over GF(2 n ) is low or when the distance of the S-box to the set of low univariate degree functions is small. This attack exploits the low degree of the algebraic relation between some input (output, respectively) and intermediate data to infer some keybits relating the output (input, respectively) and the intermediate data.
(3) Polynomials in ANF. F can be uniquely represented by m multivariate polynomials over GF(2) (called coordinate functions), where each variable has power at most one. Each of these polynomials can be expressed as a sum of all distinct kth-order product terms (0 < k ≤ n) of the variables in the form (2), (9) where P(N) denotes the power set of (2)), represents the 2 n coefficients of the polynomials of each of the m coordinate functions in AN F.
(5) Characteristic function, which is a matrix whose rows are indexed by x ∈ V n and whose columns are indexed by y ∈ V m in lexicographic order, is denoted by (2)) and defined as follows:
where θ F (x, y) stands for the indicator function defined in Equation (4). (6) Walsh Spectrum, which is a matrix whose rows are characterized by u ∈ V n and whose columns are characterized by v ∈ V m in lexicographic order, is denoted by
Linear profile, which is a matrix whose rows are characterized by u ∈ V n and whose columns are characterized by v ∈ V m in lexicographic order, is denoted by
, results from the application of the Walsh transform to the linear profile.
, is obtained by Equation (6). (10) Permutation vector. If F is a Boolean permutation, that is, it is bijective and has the same number of input bits as output bits (n = m), then it can be defined as a vector: 
Cryptographic Criteria
The cryptographic criteria that can be evaluated by means of the VBF class are the following:
(1) Nonlinearity, defined as the minimum among the nonlinearities of all nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F; it can be evaluated from the Walsh Spectrum in the following way:
where the same symbol N L is employed to denote the nonlinearity of either a scalar or a vector function. This criterion is a measure of the distance of a vector Boolean function and all affine vector Boolean functions. If this distance is small, it is possible to mount affine approximations of the vector Boolean functions involved in a cryptosystem to build attacks on this system [Matsui 1994 ]. Thus, this property is useful to assess the resistance of a vector Boolean function to linear attacks (including correlation attacks), that is, attacks where the function F is approximated by an affine function. (2) For every positive integer r, the rth-order nonlinearity of a vector Boolean function F is the minimum rth-order nonlinearity of its component functions; the rth-order nonlinearity of a Boolean function equals its minimum Hamming distance to functions of algebraic degrees at most r (see Carlet [2008b] for details):
Computing rth-order nonlinearity is not an easy task for r ≥ 2. Unlike the firstorder nonlinearity, there are no efficient algorithms to compute second-order nonlinearities for n ≥ 11. VBF library naive exhaustive search is employed for this purpose. (3) Linearity distance, defined as the minimum among the linearity distances of all nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F, may be computed from the Differential Profile using
The linearity distance of a Boolean function is a characteristic defined by the distance to the set of all Boolean functions admitting nonzero linear structures. These include, among others, all the affine functions and all nonbent quadratic functions and are defined as follows [Meier and Staffelbach 1990] :
S-boxes used in block ciphers should have no nonzero linear structures (see Evertse [1988] ). The existence of nonzero linear structures, for the functions implemented in stream ciphers, is a potential risk that should also be avoided, despite the fact that such existence could not be used in attacks, so far. (4) Balancedness. F ∈ F n,m is balanced (or has balanced output) if each possible output mtuple occurs with equal probability 2 −m
; that is, its output is uniformly distributed in V m . This criterion can be evaluated from the Walsh Spectrum in the following way:θ
Cryptographic functions must be balanced; that is, their output must be uniformly distributed over {0, 1} to avoid statistical dependence between the input and the output (which can be used in attacks).
. . , m and not all zeroes. This criterion can be obtained from the Walsh Spectrum as follows:
A function f ∈ F n is t − CI if its output is statistically independent of any subset of at most t input bits. Correlation immunity is used to assess the resistance to correlation attacks [Siegenthaler 1985] . Note that the statistical measure used to assess independency between input and output bits is (conditional) mutual information. F ∈ F n,m is t − CI if its output distribution does not change when we fix t variables x i . A t − CI function, which is also balanced, is called a t-resilient function. This criterion is related to an attack on pseudo-random generators using combining functions, called a correlation attack. If f is not t-resilient, then there exists a correlation between the output of the function and (at most) t bits of its input; if t is small, f is prone to a divide-and-conquer attack due to Siegenthaler [1985] and later improved by several authors with fast correlation attacks. For the pseudo-random generators, the best-known cryptanalytic technique is the correlation attack, which is based on the idea of finding correlation between the outputs and the inputs, that is, finding S-boxes with low resiliency. (6) Propagation. F ∈ F n,m satisfies the propagation criterion of degree l (PC(l)) if any nonzero linear combination of the component Boolean functions satisfies the PC(l). This criterion can be obtained from the Autocorrelation Spectrum in the following way:
This criterion is based on the properties of the derivatives of Boolean functions and describes the behavior of a function whenever some input bits are complemented. F ∈ F n,m is said to satisfy the propagation characteristics with respect to u ∈ V n if and only if F(x) + F(x + u) is balanced. (7) Global avalanche is defined by two indicators [Zhang and Zheng 1995] . First, the absolute indicator of F, denoted by MAX AC(F), defines the maximum absolute nonzero value of the Autocorrelation Spectrum and quantifies the distance to the set LS n . Second, the sum-of-squares indicator, denoted by σ , is the second moment of the autocorrelation coefficients. In order to achieve good diffusion, cryptographic functions should achieve low values of both indicators. (8) Algebraic degree is defined as the minimum among the algebraic degrees of all nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F [Nyberg 1993] , namely:
where the algebraic order or degree of a Boolean function is the order of the largest product term in the AN F. This criterion is obtained by generating the ANF Higher-order differential attack [Lai 1994 ] exploits the fact that the algebraic degree of the S-box is low. Other useful information in cryptanalysis can be obtained by means of the VBF class (see the member functions in Table 4 .2 of VBF [2015] ):
(1) The linear potential of F, defined as LP(F) = 1 2 2n · * max (WS (F)(u, v) 2 ), is a measure of linearity in linear cryptanalysis and satisfies [Chabaud and Vaudenay 1995] 2 −n ≤ LP(F) ≤ 1 so that the lower bound holds if and only if F has maximum nonlinearity (F is bent) and the upper bound is reached when F is linear or affine. Linear cryptanalysis is based on the idea of finding high-probable linear or affine relations between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the cipher, that is, finding S-boxes with low nonlinearity. The attack is mounted by finding highprobability parity of the sum of some input, output, and key bits, and hence deducing one bit of information about the key.
(2) Linear relations associated with a specific value of the linear profile. (3) The Differential Potential of F, defined as DP(F) = * max (DP (F)(u, v) ), is a measure of the robustness against differential cryptanalysis where 2 −m ≤ DP(F) ≤ 1 and the lower bound holds if and only if F is bent and the upper bound is reached when F is linear or affine. The differential uniformity of F ∈ F n,m and its differential potential are related by DP(F) = 2 −n DU(F). Differential cryptanalysis is based on the idea of finding high-probable differential pairs between the inputs and outputs of S-boxes present in the cipher, that is, finding S-boxes with low linearity distance. Differential cryptanalysis [Biham and Shamir 1990] can be seen as an extension of the ideas of attacks based on the presence of linear structures [Nyberg 1991] . If u is a linear structure of f , then the inputs of difference u result in output differences of 1 or −1 with probability 1. In differential cryptanalysis, it is only required that inputs of difference x lead to a known difference y with high probability, or with a probability that noticeably exceeds the mean, and hence deducing some information about the key. (4) Differential relations associated with a specific value of the Differential Profile. (5) The linear structures of F, defined as the vectors for which associated rows in the Differential Profile coincide with the vector zero. Lai [1990] showed that if f ∈ F n has k < n linearly independent vectors b 1 , . . . , b k that are linear structures, then f can be mapped to g ∈ F n via a linear transformation where
The cryptanalyst may be able to take advantage of the linear structures in f if some of the m i , i = 1, . . . , k in Equation (19) are zero, thus eliminating the influence of some variables (possibly key bits) on the ciphertext. The cryptanalytic value of linear structures lies in their potential to map a nonlinear function to a degenerate function via a linear transformation, which may reduce the size of the keyspace. (6) The maximum possible (for n even) nonlinearity for a vector Boolean function with the same dimensions as F ∈ F n,m (when n is even). The functions with maximum possible nonlinearity are called bent functions and their nonlinearity is equal to 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 [Rothaus 1976 ]. The nonlinearity of a vector Boolean function is defined as the minimum among the nonlinearities of all nonzero linear combinations of its coordinate functions. Thus, the maximum possible nonlinearity for a vector Boolean function coincides with the maximum possible nonlinearity for a Boolean function. (7) The type of function in terms of nonlinearity of a Boolean function (only for m = 1), that is, if it is linear, almost optimal, or a bent function (F with maximum nonlinearity and n even). Let f be a Boolean function with n variables. Then f is said to be almost optimal if * max (WS(F)(u, v)) ≤ 2 (n+1)/2 when n is odd, and *
when n is even. A cryptographic primitive with a high number of fixed and/or negated fixed points is considered to be not well designed, since it lacks the needed randomness.
A list of the member functions related to these criteria may be found in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 of VBF [2015] . For a detailed explanation of the cryptographic criteria and their properties, seeÁlvarez-Cubero and Zufiria [2012] .
Operations Over Vector Boolean Functions
In this subsection, the operations over vector Boolean functions supported by the VBF class are described. Some of them correspond to secondary constructions, which build (n, m) variable vector Boolean functions from (n , m ) variable ones (with n ≤ n, m ≤ m). The direct sum has been used to construct resilient and bent Boolean functions [Carlet 2004 ]. Adding coordinate functions and bricklayering (also called concatenation) are operations used to build modern ciphers such as CAST [Adams and Tavares 1993] (5) Let n = n 1 + n 2 , n 1 , n 2 ≥ 1, m ≥ 1, F ∈ F n 1 ,m , and G ∈ F n 2 ,m . The Direct Sum of F and G is the function
This is a generalization for vector Boolean functions of the construction of Boolean functions first introduced in Rothaus [1976] . (6) Let n ≥ 1, m = m 1 + m 2 , m 1 , m 2 ≥ 1 and F ∈ F n,m 1 and G ∈ F n,m 2 . The result of adding coordinate functions of F and G is the function (F, G) ∈ F n,m 1 +m 2 , where
). This is a generalization for vector Boolean functions of the method used in the CAST algorithm and studied in Nyberg [1995] by adding more than one coordinate function at the same time.
bricklayer of F and G is the function F|G ∈ F n,m , where
This construction corresponds to the bricklayer function [Daemen and Rijmen 2002] as a parallel application of a number of vector Boolean functions operating on smaller inputs. Some authors call this construction concatenation. 
EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE VBF LIBRARY

KASUMI Cipher Algorithm Evaluation
This section studies the block cipher called KASUMI; it is used in UMTS [2014] , GSM [2014] , and GPRS [2014] mobile communications systems. UMTS uses KASUMI [2014] in the confidentiality (f8) and integrity (f9) algorithms named UEA1 and UIA1 [KASUMI 2014 ], respectively. GSM employs KASUMI in the A5/3 key stream generator, whereas GPRS does so in the GEA3 key stream generator.
KASUMI encrypts a 64-bit input by iterating a round function 8 times. The round function consists of the composition of a 32-bit nonlinear mixing function (FO) and a 32-bit linear mixing function (FL). The FO function is again an iterated ladder design consisting of three rounds of a 16-bit nonlinear mixing function FI. In turn, FI is defined as a four-round structure using nonlinear lookup tables S7 and S9. All functions involved will mix the data input with key material.
In the following, each functional component of KASUMI is studied using VBF with the aim to reveal any weakness that could be used as a basis for an attack on the entire algorithm. Such study characterizes the S-boxes as well as the FI function.
4.1.1. S-boxes Characterization. The study of S-boxes S7 and S9 shows that they are Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) bijective Boolean mappings. In fact, a linear approximation analysis shows that the S7 nonlinearity (Item N L in Table II ) is equal to 56, which is the maximum value for an S-box with seven input variables. Its linear potential (Item LP in Table II ) is equal to 0.015625 and it has a second-order nonlinearity (Item N L 2 in Table II ) of 36. Concerning S9, the value for the nonlinearity is equal to 240 over the best-known bound for an S-box with nine input variables, which is 242. Its linear potential is equal to 0.00390625.
From these results, we can conclude that S7 offers the best immunity against linear attacks for a 7 × 7 S-box; in addition, S9 immunity against this type of attack is almost optimal.
A differential approximation analysis shows that the S7 linearity distance is equal to 28 over a maximum value of 32 and its differential potential is equal to 0.015625. Finally, the value for the linearity distance of S9 is equal to 0 and its differential potential is equal to 0.00390625.
From these results, we can conclude that S7 and S9 do not have an optimal immunity against differential attacks.
The algebraic normal forms of S7 and S9 are given by Equations (22) and (23), respectively:
+x 1 x 2 f 4 = 1 + x 7 + x 5 x 8 + x 4 x 5 + x 3 x 9 + x 3 x 8 + x 2 x 6 + x 2 x 5 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 f 5 = x 8 x 9 + x 6 x 8 + x 5 + x 4 x 9 + x 3 x 6 + x 2 x 9 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 x 8 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 6 f 6 = x 9 + x 7 x 8 + x 6 x 9 + x 5 x 7 + x 4 + x 3 x 9 + x 3 x 8 + x 2 x 5 + x 1 x 9 + x 1 x 8 + x 1 x 2 f 7 = 1 + x 8 + x 6 x 9 + x 5 x 6 + x 4 x 9 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 6 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 5 + x 2 x 4 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 + x 1 x 9 f 8 = 1 + x 8 + x 8 x 9 + x 6 x 7 + x 5 x 9 + x 5 x 8 + x 4 x 9 + x 4 x 6 + x 3 + x 2 x 8 + x 2 x 7 + x 1 x 4 f 9 = 1 + x 7 x 9 + x 6 + x 4 x 7 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 9 + x 2 x 8 + x 2 x 7 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 2 .
These forms show that the algebraic degree of S7 is 3 and the algebraic degree of S9 is 2. The algebraic degree of both S-boxes is low and higher-order differential attack can be executed against them. The component algebraic immunity of S7 is equal to 3 and for S9 is 2. As a consequence, algebraic attacks by solving a system of multivariate algebraic equations can be executed against S7 and especially against S9.
Concerning the cycle structure, S7 and S9 have no obvious deficiencies, for example, a large number of transpositions. S7 has one fixed point, (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) and has no negated fixed points. S9 has one fixed point, (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) and one negated fixed point, (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). The cycle structure of the S7 and S9 permutations is shown in Table I .
Regarding the second moment of the autocorrelation coefficients, for S7 the absolute indicator is 16 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 32,768. For S9 the absolute indicator is 512 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 524,288.
From these results, we can conclude that S7 achieves a fairly good diffusion since its absolute indicator is nearer the lower theoretical bound, 0, than the upper bound, 128, and similarly for the sum-of-squares indicator where the theoretical bounds are 16,384 and 2,097,152. S9 does not achieve a good diffusion because its absolute indicator coincides with the upper bound, 512, while its sum-of-squares indicator is quite close to the lower bound of 262,144. A summary of these criteria is given in Table II . The Walsh Spectra of the S7 and S9 mappings are three valued (except from the first row and column value): 16, 0, and −16 for S7, and 32, 0, and −32 for S9. The Linear Profiles of the S7 and S9 mappings are two-valued (except from the first row and column value): 0 and 256 for S7, and 0 and 1, 024 for S9. The Differential Profile of the S7 and S9 mappings are two-valued (except from the first row and column value): 0 and 32, 768 for S7, and 0 and 524, 288 for S9. The Autocorrelation Spectrum of the S7 mapping is four-valued: 128, 16, −16, and 0 for S7, and three-valued for S9: 512, −512, and 0. Having a few-valued WS indicates good cryptographic properties (see Gong et al. [2014] ).
The cryptanalysis performed in this section provides, to the best of our knowledge, new results about S7 and S9 that do not appear in 3rd Generation Partnership Project [2001] . For example, representations of both S-boxes as Truth Table, polynomials in ANF, ANF tables, and Walsh Spectrum are calculated (via the Truth Table) ; in addition, cryptographic criteria such as nonlinearity, second-order nonlinearity, linearity distance, algebraic immunity, absolute indicator, and sum-of-squares indicator are also computed.
FI Function Characterization.
The FI function is a 16 × 16-vector Boolean function that constitutes the basic randomizing function of KASUMI. It is composed of a fourround structure using the S-boxes S7 and S9 as shown in Figure 1 .
The function FI takes a 16-bit data input I and 16-bit subkey KI i, j . The input I is split into two unequal components, a 9-bit left half L 0 and a 7-bit right half R 0 , where I = L 0 ||R 0 . Similarly, the key KI i, j is split into a 7-bit component KI i, j,1 and a 9-bit component KI i, j,2 , where KI i, j = KI i, j,1 ||KI i, j,2 . The function uses two S-boxes, S7, which maps a 7-bit input to a 7-bit output, and S9, which maps a 9-bit input to a 9-bit output. It also uses two additional functions that are designated ZE() and TR(), where ZE(x) takes the 7-bit value x and converts it to a 9-bit value by adding two 0 bits to the most-significant end and TR(x) takes the 9-bit value x and converts it to a 7-bit value by discarding the two most significant bits. The following equations summarize the implementation of function FI: 
The algebraic degree of the FI function for all the possible 65, 536 values of the key was analyzed. This study reveals that two values of algebraic degree are obtained: 15 and 16 with a frequency of 32, 931 and 32, 605, respectively. Such degrees reveal that FI has a very good resistance against higher-order differential attacks as the maximum possible algebraic degree is 16.
Concerning the cycle structure, the FI function was analyzed for all the possible 65, 536 values of the key. There are key values for which the number of cycles is quite high; for example, the key 0xa77b has the maximum number of cycles, 2, 907. This number of cycles is more than three times the proportion that was present in S9. In this case, a higher number of transpositions was expected and it could reveal some kind of deficiency.
For several keys, this function has a significant amount of fixed points and/or negated fixed points. The maximum number of fixed points is six for key values: 0x57bc, 0x5c38, 0x6bf e, 0x7b4b, 0x85c2, 0x987e, 0x9a32, 0xa3e f, 0xa5ab, 0xacbb, 0xb0b4, 0xb0e5, 0xb327, 0xb5c7, 0xb90d, 0xc4ee, 0xc7e4, 0xca74, 0xcb5d, 0xcb5d, 0xcd11, 0xcdbe, 0xce24, 0xd5da, 0xe3ce, 0xe4eb, 0xe531, 0xea3b, 0xe f 5c, 0x f 276, 0x f 59e, 0x f d44.
(27) The maximum number of negated fixed points is seven for key values:
0x2c3c, 0x4041, 0x4343, 0x06e9, 0x518 f, 0x59ac, 0xa161, 0xa244, 0xab77, 0xe1d1, 0x1aee, 0x1df 0.
The key value 0xb0b4 has 10 fixed or negated fixed points and a number of key values have nine fixed or negated fixed points: 0x3bd0, 0x4343, 0x5e94, 0x5 f f 3, 0x6271, 0x682d, 0x6e45, 0x99e3, 0xab77, 0xb750, 0xc5da, 0xd5da, 0x167d, 0x1df 0.
This number of fixed and/or negated fixed points is not very high compared with the total number of possible inputs/outputs, 65, 536, and we may, therefore, conclude that the FI function is reasonably well designed.
The Walsh Spectra of FI for several keys have also been computed and from this, the nonlinearities and linear potentials of FI for the 65, 536 keys have been obtained. Nonlinearities range from 31, 534 (with the keys 081e, 2d71, and 52c4) to 32, 049 (with the key c6a6) and linear potentials from 0.00048146 to 0.00141818. Although these nonlinearity values are far from the maximum possible, 32, 640, the linear potentials do not reveal an obvious vulnerability to linear attacks.
As a summary, the KASUMI analysis with VBF provides values for the characteristics analyzed that are similar to those obtained in previous studies [3rd Generation Partnership Project 2001] . In addition, new characteristics such as the algebraic degree, cycle structure, fixed points, negated fixed points, and nonlinearities are also provided. A detailed description of KASUMI cipher analysis within "KASUMI Analysis" in the "Examples" menu can be found in VBFlib [2015] .
Mini-AES Cipher Algorithm Evaluation
Raphael Chung-Wei Phan presented a version of the AES [Phan 2002] , with all the parameters significantly reduced while preserving its original structure. This Mini version is purely educational and is designed to grasp the underlying concepts of Rijndaellike ciphers. It may also serve as a testbed for starting cryptanalysts to experiment with various cryptanalytic attacks. The Mini-AES cipher is a 16 × 16-vector Boolean function and the Mini-AES encryption is performed with a secret key of 16 bits.
4.2.1. S-box Characterization. The Mini-AES S-box is called NibbleSub, and it defines a simple operation that substitutes each input with an output according to a 4 × 4 substitution table (S-box) given in Table III . These values are, in fact, taken from the first row of the first S-box in DES.
The study of the S-box shows that it defines APN bijective Boolean mappings. In fact, a linear approximation analysis shows that the nonlinearity is equal to 2 while the maximum value for an S-box with four input variables is 6. Its linear potential is equal to 0.5625 and it has a second-order nonlinearity of 0. From these results, we can conclude that NibbleSub does not offer good immunity against linear attacks for a 4 × 4 S-box.
A differential approximation analysis shows that the NibbleSub linearity distance is equal to 0 over a maximum value of 4 and its differential potential is equal to 0.5. From the previous results, we can conclude that NibbleSub does not have optimal immunity against differential attacks. The algebraic normal form of NibbleSub is
These forms show that the algebraic degree of NibbleSub is 2, which is not high enough to be immune against higher-order differential attacks. The component algebraic immunity is equal to 2: as a consequence, algebraic attacks by solving a system of multivariate algebraic equations can be easily executed.
Concerning the cycle structure, it has no obvious deficiencies, for example, a large number of transpositions; in addition, it has no fixed points and two negated fixed points (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1, 1). The cycle structure is given in Table IV .
Regarding the second moment of the autocorrelation coefficients, the absolute indicator is equal to 16 and the sum-of-squares indicator is 1,408. Hence, NibbleSub does not achieve a good diffusion because its absolute indicator reaches the upper bound of 16 while its sum-of-squares indicator is quite close to the upper bound of 4, 096.
A summary of the results for these criteria is represented in Table V 
Mini-AES Cipher
Characterization. The algebraic degree of Mini-AES for all the possible 65, 536 values of the key was analyzed. This study reveals that only one value of algebraic degree is obtained: 14, which indicates that Mini-AES has a fairly good resistance against higher-order differential attacks since the maximum possible algebraic degree is 16.
In addition, the cycle structure of Mini-AES was analyzed for all the possible 65, 536 values of the key. It was found that no key values provide a high number of cycles: the key (expressed in hexadecimal representation) 0x9e06 has the maximum number of cycles, 28. No deficiency is expected with respect to this criterion.
For several keys, this cipher has a relevant amount of fixed points and/or negated fixed points. The maximum number of fixed points is 7 for key values 0x0352, 0x4661, 0x5557, and 0x783 f . The maximum number of negated fixed points is 9 for key values 0x1d9b and 0x7734. The key values 0x1d9b and 0x4661 have 11 fixed or negated fixed and several values have 10 fixed or negated fixed points: 0x010a, 0x0164, 0x1ce9, 0x24cd, 0x2e38, 0x4a15, 0x5015, 0x7734, 0x783 f, 0x9868, 0x9 f 18, 0xa8af, 0xaec4, 0xbc85, 0xc9ca, 0xdb09, 0x f 580.
(31) This number of fixed and/or negated fixed points is not very high when compared with the total number of possible inputs/outputs (65, 536). We can conclude that the Mini-AES cipher is reasonably well designed from this point of view. Several Walsh Spectra of Mini-AES for different keys have also been computed, and from these the nonlinearities and linear potentials of Mini-AES for more of the 65, 536 keys have been obtained. Nonlinearities range from 31, 432 (with the key 69b0) to 32, 040 (with the key f 7de) and linear potentials from 0.000493586 to 0.001662314. Although these nonlinearities are far from the maximum possible nonlinearity, 32, 640, the linear potentials do not reveal an obvious vulnerability to linear attacks.
Search for Vector Boolean Functions with Excellent Profiles
Boolean functions with very high nonlinearity pose some of the most challenging problems in the area of symmetric cryptography and combinatorics. For functions with an even number of variables, n, the maximum possible nonlinearity 2 n−1 −2 n/2−1 is attained for the well-known bent functions. However, for the case when n is odd, constructing Boolean functions with maximum possible nonlinearity is an unsettled open problem. Hence, so far suboptimal results have been mainly obtained via heuristic search; for example, for n = 9 the best-known nonlinearity result is 242 [Kavut and Yucel 2010] .
In this section, we illustrate how the VBF library can be employed to apply a steepest descent for a search of nine-variable Boolean functions with the highest nonlinearity. Using this algorithm, we have found 5, 121 Boolean functions with nonlinearity 242, which can be grouped into five different affine equivalence classes. Two Boolean functions f, g are affine equivalent if the following equality holds:
where A ∈ M n×n (GF(2)), b, c ∈ V n , and d ∈ GF(2). There are some function properties that are invariant over the mapping defined in Equation (32). In fact, the five obtained affine equivalence classes can be identified by invariant properties such as the frequency distribution of the absolute values of the Walsh Spectrum or the Autocorrelation Spectrum. These invariants have been obtained for the five affine equivalence classes with the VBF library, providing the results shown in Table VI .
We have found millions Boolean functions within the classes f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 , f 5 . The Truth Tables of all these Boolean functions are available from VBFlib [2015] . Using the VBF library, the value of other cryptographic criteria (linearity distance, second-order nonlinearity, algebraic degree, algebraic immunity, absolute indicator, and sum-of-squares indicator) are easily computed for each one of these Boolean functions. Table VIII shows the range of values such criteria take for the functions within each class.
This information allows for an appropriate function selection for cipher design. For instance, among all these functions with the highest nonlinearity, we can determine those with highest linearity distance (LD = 122, located in the second class). The hexadecimal representation of the Truth Tables of these finally selected two functions are B8F E8F795F6C DA63F A26AC2B2EBB477B7058C266BE53DC0480DF6BFC B8 A70E54A4E7EF DF91788517C9C F410DA90A10EBC E7A663C2B1F4B2C634DA 1C1DE5C54AA
E2A42ADC F AC980395F83F67174E1E2DED5F D983C E40979A1DA85C E591D0
2540EF EBD4A7A34DDDF4D6C6A1B57F350B54E6BDF3C667145EE89391704 647BF90EF0.
These specific functions may be used in the construction of high-performance S-boxes for cipher design. 
COMPUTATIONAL COST RESULTS
This section assesses and displays the computational performance of the VBF library algorithms via its application to a cryptographic characterization of S-boxes with different size n × m. The program, described in Algorithm I in VBF [2015] , first generates random Truth Tables, which correspond to vector Boolean functions with dimensions ranging from n = 4 to n = 17 and from m = 1 to m = 15. It then calculates the cryptographic criteria of the vector Boolean functions given from these Truth Tables. The calculations were performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600K CPU @3.40GHz, 16GB RAM, 1TB Debian Linux. Figure 2 presents the corresponding computing times graphically, which happen to be a good measure of the computational complexity, provided the computer resources are not exhausted. (If m + n is too large for the whole computation to take place in the available RAM, then the compute time will increase drastically due to hard disk swapping.) As expected, in normal computer conditions, the computational complexity grows exponentially in the bit length of the vector Boolean functions.
In Figure 3 , we present detailed timing measurements corresponding to the different functions tested for the values n = 17 and m = 1. This heterogeneous distribution of the computing times reflects the diverse complexity of the different routines provided by the VBF library.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, a C++ library designed to analyze vector Boolean functions from a cryptographic perspective has been presented. It represents a very useful tool for analyzing cryptographic primitives expressed as vector Boolean functions in a very efficient way. This class supports as input a broad range of vector Boolean function representation data structures such as Truth Tables, ANF tables, polynomials in ANF, trace representations, permutation and linear matrices, and DES-like S-boxes. Then it can provide new structures that represent cryptographic criteria such as the Walsh Spectrum, Differential Profile, and Autocorrelation Spectrum, among others. Cryptographic criteria such as nonlinearity, linearity distance, correlation immunity, balancedness, algebraic degree, algebraic immunity, and propagation criterion are easily obtained. The behavior of the cryptographic properties of secondary constructions resulting from operations over vector Boolean functions can also be studied by means of the VBF class. The applicability of the library has been illustrated by analyzing real systems such as the KASUMI and Mini-AES block ciphers, and by determining Boolean functions with very high nonlinearity that are robust against linear attacks.
